ERIC Document Resume	See Instruction Sheet	DATE OF RESUME 7/15/65	DATE RECEIVED

A. PUBLICATION DATA

1. ERIC NUMBER	2. ORIGINATOR CONTROL NO(S).	3. IDENTIFICATION NO.
ED002060	N.A.	N.A.

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACE BELOW

4. AUTHOR(S): McWortee, Gerald A. and others

5. TITLE OF DOCUMENT ABSTRACTED: Freedom Day II in Chicago

6. PUBLICATION TITLE: Integrated Education Issue 10

7. EDITOR(S): Weinberg, Meyer

8. PLACE OF ORIGIN
ORG. Integrated Education Associates, 343 S.
ST. Dearborn Street
CITY, STATE Chicago, Illinois
TELE. EXT.
INST/LOC CODE

9. PUBLISHER OR SOURCE
Integrated Education Associates
343 South Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill.

10. VOL.	11. PAGES	12. MO./YR.	13. TOTAL PP.
II	34-40	May 1964	7

MICROFILM COPY AVAILABLE YES ☒ NO ☐

COPYRIGHT GRANTED YES ☒ NO ☐

COPYRIGHT RELEASE FILED YES ☒ NO ☐

TYPE OF REPORT
PROPOSAL ☐
IN-PROGRESS ☐
FINAL ☒
FOLLOW-UP ☐

OTHER ERIC REFERENCES:

ERIC SATELLITE CODE

B. INDEXING DATA

14. SUBJECT AREA

15. TYPE OF ENDEAVOR: Report

16. INDEXING TERMS (6-12)

school boycotts	community organizations			
integrated school	parent attitudes			
community attitudes	news media			

17. ABSTRACT (MAX. 250 WORDS)

Interviews were conducted to find why Negroes who had been pre-boycott in October changed to an anti-boycott stand four months later. Those who changed tended to be well-educated people who had not made their decision easily. They stressed the quality of education rather than racial balance in the schools.

ERIC No.

18. SOURCE OF ABSTRACT

C. FUNDING DATA

19. SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION	20. DIVISION OR DEPT.	21. CONTRACT NO. / PROJECT NO.
	22. TOTAL COST OF PROJECT	
	23. DURATION OF PROJECT	U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Office of Education

ED002060

FREEDOM DAY II IN CHICAGO

Ramon J. Rivera,
Gerald A. McWorter,
and Ernest Lillienstein

A less technical version of a report delivered to a panel on Race and Social Change at the 41st Annual Institute for Social Research at the University of Chicago, May 14, 1964. The senior author is a Study Director at the National Opinion Research Center, which conducted the study; the junior authors were Research Assistants on this study.

This is a preliminary report on a piece of "fire brigade" research — a study of the second Chicago school boycott. We can begin by noting that this survey moved through its planning and design stages in exactly three days. It is probably impossible to design anything that is truly complex in that length of time and the plan of our research has a certain inevitable, if misguided, simplicity about it. The first lesson we have to offer to anyone planning a comparable study in the civil rights field is: don't hurry, but when you must, never believe anything you read in the newspapers.

Why were the news media a problem? They were a problem because in the absence of any other reliable authority, we allowed the mass media to dictate the logic of the design of our survey. If we pause for a moment to review the history of the Chicago school boycotts, it will be possible to recall the predictions and assumptions that were prevalent in mid-February, 1964, when this survey was planned.

The first, or October, 1963, boycott, had been a huge success, at least from the point of view of scope of participation. True, Superintendent Ben Willis still sat in his office at 228 North LaSalle Street — despite the protesters' call for his resignation — but the civil rights groups who had initiated the boycott had demonstrated their ability, under certain conditions, to keep 225,000 of Chicago's school children away from their classrooms. Their protest was directed against injustices which Willis had been accused of creating or maintaining during his term of office. We noted that these groups had been effective under certain conditions. What conditions did we have in mind?

First of all, there was, prior to the initial boycott, a relative lack of organized opposition within the Negro community itself. The direct action civil rights organizations, CORE, SNCC, and the CCCO (Coordinating Council of Community Organizations — a federation of principal civil rights groups) were the prime movers of the boycott. They were joined enthusiastically by many of the churches. The older, more conservative organizations maintained a noncommital attitude. Most important, they did not actively oppose the October boycott; nor did the Negro politicians. The picture presented by the Negro community was one of broad consensus on the appropriateness of a boycott and this consensus seemed strong enough to discourage serious expressions of disagreement.

One important by-product of this institutions which were willing to house and care for the children involved in the boycott. In a community with a high rate of family disorganization and a large number of working mothers, participation in a school boycott — especially for younger children — will often be contingent upon the parent's ability to find someone willing to care for her children during the time they would have been at school. This task was generally assumed by the churches and a new

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type of educational institution, the Freedom School — originated in Boston the previous June — was organized.

Finally, there was a lack of really serious opposition from organizations within the white community. It was mentioned by some white officials, for example, that the boycott was illegal. Yet the illegality of the boycott was denied by others and the leaders of the boycott were free to plan their work without fear of immediate legal reprisal.

This picture had shifted considerably as Chicago approached Freedom Day II. According to the reports of the news media, consensus within the Negro community had all but disappeared. The more conservative civil rights groups, for example, were less willing to contain their objections to the tactics employed by the militants. The most threatening development, however, came with the announcements of Negro aldermen Campbell and Holman: Not only were they personally opposed to the boycott; their precinct workers were under instructions to canvass their local communities and collect signatures from Negro citizens, pledging to send their children to school. And, overnight, there sprang full-born a new civil rights group — The Assembly to End Prejudice, Injustice and Poverty — with a strong anti-boycott platform, which claimed to have reached a meeting of minds with the Chicago Board of Education.

There was also considerable opposition from the churches. The National Baptist Convention refused to support another boycott and urged its congregations to keep their children in school. The AME's took a similar stand. It became painfully obvious that fewer Freedom Schools would be available for persons willing to participate in the second boycott — and this factor added one more reason for anticipating a sharply reduced number of school absentees.

Finally, it was made abundantly clear by city authorities that to organize a boycott was a crime and to join in one was to render oneself suspect in the eyes of the law. A public welfare recipient, for example, who was tempted to boycott might be forgiven some uneasiness concerning his relief status, once he had been told by his precinct worker that he was violating the law.

These at least were the myths and events that colored the air as Chicago prepared for Freedom Day II. We had listened to them closely enough to make three basic assumptions:

First of all, we decided that the second school boycott would be something of a flop. The Negro community would divide sharply under the conflicting demands upon their loyalty. It would be impossible to serve at the same time, the CCCO on one hand, and the aldermen and Urban League on the other. Someone had to lose something and we thought that the more militant groups were likely to lose most.

We also assumed that the politicians would be most effective in neutralizing the more deprived sections of their wards. We banked heavily on the Negro slum-dweller's presumed allegiance to Chicago's Democratic machine and the advantage of direct personal contact which the precinct workers would enjoy.

Finally, we decided that middle class Negroes would also defect from the boycott, but that their defection would spring, not from a commitment to local politicial figures, but from a basic approval of the positions and tacts of the more conservative Civil Rights organizations. Many of you will recall that the Hauser Report on school integration was then in progress. For many, it was a good time not to rock the boat, for the "proper" machinery had already been put in motion and there were, in addition, cases awaiting disposition in the courts.

Having made these assumptions, we set about to locate areas of Chicago where cross-pressures would be rather acute and where we might witness our a-priori assumptions blossom into empirical reality. We decided to draw quota samples from seven school dis-

tricts, selected on the basis of their social composition and their presumed exposure to anti-boycott politicians.

Schools A, B and C are located in predominantly well-educated Negro areas. School A is in Kenwood, B and C are located in Chatham. School District A is represented on the City Council by an alderman who was flatly opposed to the boycott. The alderman representing Schools B and C had not taken a public position. Schools D through G are quite close, and quite low, in terms of educational attainment. The two sets of school districts are differentiated mainly by the attitude of their aldermen. Alderman Chew, representing the 17th Ward, was the only Negro alderman openly to support the second school boycott and to work closely with its organizers. Alderman Campbell was strongly opposed to the boycott and an important figure in the resistance movement. Each of the seven schools was essentially empty on Freedom Day I and each school had shown itself to be completely, or overwhelmingly, Negro on the day of the board of education's racial nose count.

A total of 362 persons were interviewed in these school districts. Respondents were selected by a quota sample technique within city blocks.

TABLE 1

PER CENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE AT LEAST GRADUATED FROM HIGH SCHOOL BY POSITIONS ON FIRST AND SECOND BOYCOTTS

Position on Second (February) Boycott	Position on First (October) Boycott	
	Supported	Opposed, Couldn't Decide
Supported	49.5 (204)	— (10)
Opposed, Couldn't Decide	72.1 (68)	35.1 (37)

All but two respondents were Negro; virtually all of them were the mothers or female guardians of elementary school children.

Initially we were anxious to check the relevance of local political activity. Each respondent had been asked:

> "Are you supporting the school boycott, at this time? (Which comes closest to the way you feel now?)"

A comparable question was asked to determine each respondent's position concerning the original school boycott in October.

There was a discernible drop in personal support in each area sampled. The proportions supporting in October ranged from roughly 75 to 90 per cent; in February, the range was from 56 to 70 per cent.

There were obvious inter-area differences, but considering the reputation of Chicago's Democratic machine, it is surprising to note that an alderman's position on the boycott proved to be unrelated either to the position of his constituents or the shift in position which they experienced over time. Examining the patterns in terms of the socioeconomic characteristics of these areas, there is a hint that the respondent's educational status, rather than local political activity, was the critical factor in shaping boycott decisions.

Table 1 makes this pattern explict. Respondents are grouped in terms of the basic patterns of stability and

shifts that occurred between the two boycott dates. The case bases (204, 68,10,37) tell us that stability was more common than shifts, and that shifts, when they occurred, were typically in the direction of opposition to the second boycott. The percentages (49.5, etc) indicate the proportion of high school graduates in each category. In a sentence: *Those who shifted from a pro to an anti-boycott stand between October and February were disproportionately persons of higher educational attainment.*

These figures imply a challenge to at least one widely held assumption concerning the values of middle-class Negroes: that such persons attach overriding importance to the principle of desegregated public school facilities.

We have some indirect, but rather interesting data on this point. It has to do with the question: "What do Negroes in Chicago *want* from their schools?" Each respondent was handed a list of functions that the school might perform. They were asked to designate the *two* functions that they felt were the "most important jobs for the public schools to do."

There is at least one item which merits special attention. According to these data, Negroes with twelve years of schooling or more are *less* likely to feel that public schools should teach children of different races to live together. (See Table 2.)

TABLE 2

IDENTIFICATION OF THE "MOST IMPORTANT JOBS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO DO" BY RESPONDENT'S EDUCATION

Most Important Jobs for Public Schools To Do	Respondent's Education		Observed Difference
	Less than High School Graduate	High School Graduate or More	
A. Build good character-like honesty	21.2	27.9	+ 6.7
B. Teach basic subjects like spelling, reading, and arithmetic	44.1	48.6	+ 4.5
C. Teach children of different races to live together	46.4	37.4	— 9.0
D. Give children something to do until they are old enough to work	10.1	3.4	— 6.7
E. Teach children to be polite and respect adults	21.8	11.2	—10.6
F. Make children interested in learning	44.7	63.7	+19.0
G. Keep children under control	10.1	6.7	— 3.4
	198.4*	198.9*	
N	(179)	(179)	

*Adds up to more than 100.0% because respondents were asked to identify the two most important items.

At the very least, we can say that this finding is unexpected. The patterns generated by the other items on the list, however, ring true. Thus, for this particular sample of Negroes, it is possible to point to a relative lack of emphasis among better educated Negroes on this particular civil rights goal. Whatever other disagreements high status Negroes might have had with the announced goals of the boycott, their final decision to support or oppose was apparently made from a different frame of reference and a differentially weighted set of educational priorities.

How *easily* were final decisions concerning the second boycott made? One of the questions asked was:

> "How difficult was (is) it for you to make a final decision about whether or not to support the boycott?"

The group which experienced the *most* difficulty in deciding to boycott is again the better educated category of respondents who had shifted to an anti-boycott stand as Freedom Day II approached.

What can we say about the social contexts within which these deceisions were made — and especially, the decision to defect from support in October?

Each respondent was handed a list of various types of persons and groups with whom she might be expected to come into contact. The respondent was first asked to identify any person on the list who had influenced her attitude toward the boycott. Next she was asked to identify those persons she had actually *talked* to about the second boycott. For the moment, we shall discuss only *three* of the groups on the list: Other parents in the neighborhood, political leaders, and the civil rights groups. Table 3 describes the proportions identifying these groups as sources of influence and as sources of personal contacts.

Looking first at "other parents in the neighborhood," we note that persons who supported both boycotts were more likely to report both personal contact and influence from their neighbors. Persons shifting to an anti-boycott position were apparently making their decisions in something of a vacuum as far as neighborhood contacts were concerned. Interestingly enough, they did report slightly more contact and slightly more personal influence from politicians. They were less likely than the stable supporters to acknowledge civil rights groups on either count. Although the percentage difference is small, the sources of influence these shifters acknowledge are weighted toward sources beyond the local community, and toward one source (the political arena) which was a center of controversy.

Each respondent was also asked: "As far as you know, what general position have the persons in each of these groups taken on the boycott question? Do they generally *support* the school boycott, are they *uncertain* or *pretty evenly split*, or are they *opposed* to a boycott of the schools?" There are marked differences in perception associated with the respondents' p e r s o n a l boycott position. Neighborhood parents, for example, were perceived by stable supporters as being largely pro-boycott. Those who switched to an anti-boycott position were generally quick to admit that they had *no idea* where the neighborhood stood on the question. Above we learned that the boycott supporters were more likely to acknowledge contact with other parents. In this particular instance, their contacts seem to have been within a strongly pro-boycott environment and that environment was perceived as supporting and perhaps reinforcing their own decisions.

These persons also perceived political leaders as basically split. While those who opposed the second boycott also acknowledged uncertainty among politicians, they were again more likely to resist making any definite appraisal of the political climate at all. A comparable pattern appeared when respondents are asked about the civil rights organizations. Those supporting the boycott identified these groups as divided or as holding positions similar

to their own. Those who had shifted against the boycott either acknowledged a split or again resisted making any specific judgment concerning their stand.

These patterns of response are especially revealing if we remind ourselves that this tendency toward acknowledging a divided world or refusing to commit one's self to any specific answer occurred among the *most highly educated segment* of our sample. Additionally, we can observe that within this segment the local community was not extensively used as a frame of reference for boycott decisions, and finally, that they tended to assign less weight to the desirability of desegregated education. These persons were also most likely to acknowledge the fact that for them, the second school boycott represented a rather painful decision.

Finally, each respondent had been asked: "How closely have you been following the news of the new boycott on radio, TV and in the papers?" Let us consider the proportions reporting that they followed the boycott news "very closely" in terms of the boycott decisions made in October and February.

About one-third of the October supporters were closely involved in the mass media and this is roughly true for *both* types of February decisions. Put differently, we can say that defectors and stable supporters were equally likely to be exposed to the type of information which led NORC to design this survey around the assumption that politicians and anti-boycott civil rights groups would take a large toll among those who had supported Freedom Day I. Apparently, the defectors made the same mistake that we did. They believed everything that they read in the newspapers.

At the moment we have only preliminary findings to report. We have also been exceedingly selective in reporting them — selective in choosing points of emphasis among the data that we now have. For example, Negroes opposing *both* boycotts might not have existed for all the attention they were given here. They did exist, but mostly we have concerned ourselves with those who *defected* from a pro-boycott stand in October to an anti-boycott stand four months later.

TABLE 3

PER CENT WHO HAD TALKED TO AND WHO REPORTED BEING INFLUENCED BY MEMBERS OF SELECTED GROUPS BY POSITIONS ON FIRST AND SECOND BOYCOTTS

Group	First-Second Boycott Positions	Per Cent Influenced by Members of Group	Per Cent Talking to Members of Group
Other parents in the neighborhood	Sup — Sup	12.4 (194)	27.7 (188)
	Sup — Opp	4.5 (66)	11.5 (61)
Political leaders	Sup — Sup	9.8 (194)	4.8 (188)
	Sup — Opp	12.1 (66)	8.2 (61)
The Civil Rights group	Sup — Sup	28.4 (194)	5.6 (188)
	Sup — Opp	10.6 (66)	0.0 (61)

Basically, this is what we have to say about these persons:

First of all, they tend to be rather well educated.

They are also persons who did not make their boycott decisions easily.

They tend to stress the *quality* of their children's education over the number of whites who happen to be enrolled in neighborhood schools.

They seem to have one unfortunate habit. They read newspapers and watch TV about as much as anyone else who feels concerned about local issues — but after they do this, they hesitate to check out their ideas with their neighbors.

They *probably* wind up believing that their neighbors listen to the same programs that they listen to — and that we listened to — and that the world is a sea of uncertainty and doubt, especially when it comes to school boycotts.

And then they decide to send their children to school on Freedom Day.

Increasingly in the North, demonstrations are interpreted as being violent when in fact the violence is almost 100 percent from those attempting to suppress these protests. Events are turned upside down and made to be the opposite of what they are.

—Rev. Robert W. Spike,
May 4, 1964

PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION

Jacob Landers

The author, assistant superintendent in charge of integration programs in New York City schools, was formerly coordinator of the Higher Horizons program. Based on the Kornberg Memorial Lecture at Queens College, May 14, 1964.

The academic year 1963-1964 has given many clear indications of the determination of New York City to maintain its position of leadership in the education of disadvantaged youngsters.

For twenty years or more, educators and psychologists have been talking about the inadequacy of group tests of intelligence for all children, and have been emphasizing their complete failure as tests of the intelligence of minority group children. Today, New York City stands as the only major city which has eliminated their use—surely a tremendous step forward.

Our after-school study centers now reach more than 100,000 children in more than 250 schools operating five days a week, at a cost of more than $3.5 million a year. For the children to whom time is crucial, we have extended the school day, with many opportunities for skilled instruction in small groups.

The most controversial of the recent proposals are those which relate to the pairing of schools, and I think that it is necessary to underscore their importance.

In the first place, they represent a symbol of the efforts of New York City to secure meaningful integration combined with quality education. Built into every one of the proposals is a plan for improved education and extended services. The actual number of schools involved may be few, but the value as a symbol of commitment to an ideal is great indeed.

Secondly, the concept of the neighborhood school has been broadened into that of the community school. The community is larger than the neighborhood, and includes children of varying ethnic groups.

In the third place, the idea of integration in school life is accepted as